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Condemning Colonization: Abraham Lincoln’s Rejected Proposal for a
Central American Colony
Abstract

This article focuses on a proposal by Abraham Lincoln to settle freed African Americans in Central American
countries. The backlash from several countries reveals that other countries besides the warring United States
were also struggling with reconciling racial issues. This also reveals how interwoven racial issues were with
political crises during the Civil War because it not only effected domestic policies but also international
relations.
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CONDEMING
COLONIZATION:
ABRAHAM
LINCOLN’S REJECTED PROPOSAL FOR A
CENTRAL AMERICAN COLONY
Matthew Harris

By the second year of the Civil War, the issue of
racial inequality was not only a critical part of the divided
country’s domestic feud but also a key component in the
Union’s foreign policy. Events during the mid-1800’s
revealed that racial strife and tensions existed not only
within the warring states but also across the hemisphere.
Several Central American nations’ rejection of suggested
Union initiatives showed how intertwined race and politics
had become after the first year of conflict.
On August 12, 1862, Abraham Lincoln met with a
group of former Washington slaves to discuss the future of
African American society. Lincoln’s initial Emancipation
Proclamation, which freed every slave in the Confederate
States of America, was still over a month away. Here, he was
speaking with a select group of freedmen, hoping to figure
out the destination of the millions of African Americans,
whose new future he was privately constructing with
Congress.1 The problem was that Lincoln did not know what
to do once all of those people were free. He knew that very
1

Lincoln had begun acquiring funds for a colonial expedition as early
as March and considering emancipation as early as July; see Roy P.
Basler, ed., 1861-1862, vol. 5, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 370.
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soon he was going to free millions of slaves from bondage
and was desperately concerned about how the country
should proceed from there.
Lincoln’s speech to the freedmen was not long, but it
held grim tones. He openly admitted that he did not know
how to best aid African Americans. Just because their
freedom was near did not mean that they would have a happy
future. The poor race relations that had, and, he imagined,
always would, existed between blacks and whites troubled
Lincoln. He believed that neither group could ever get along:
“In a word we suffer on each side.”2 Lincoln was thinking
ahead. Most Unionists did not want to give up their land for
former slaves, even if they wanted relative equality. One
possible solution, therefore, was to send them off to establish
their own country.3
Lincoln implored his audience to make sacrifices for
future generations and set out to establish their own country.
Liberia was open as a colony to freed American slaves, but
the country lay across the Atlantic, far from what most
African Americans considered their home. Most African
Americans and abolitionists had abandoned the concept of
colonization, suggesting it was a lazy excuse for not simply
improving the American social system.4 Thus, Lincoln
suggested that the freedmen look to nearby Central America
2

Ibid., 371.
Ibid.
4
A notable opponent to colonization of Liberia was abolitionist
William Lloyd Garrison, who initially supported resettling the African
coast but realized that this just pushed the problem of racial equality off
rather than confronting it head on; see Angela F. Murphy, Jerry Rescue
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 41-42.
3
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as their new home. A location that connected both the
Atlantic and Pacific seemed most suitable to Lincoln, and he
suggested that it could serve as the hub for transportation
between Eastern and Western coasts of the United States.
The president seemed to have a particular spot in mind. The
meeting closed with Lincoln advising the freedmen to
consider the proposition. He then assured them that
resources and government support would always be
available if they chose to go.5
The President’s suggestion to send large numbers of
freed slaves to Central America caused international
backlash and showed that other countries were still adapting
to mixed-race societies just as much as the warring United
States. Two major factors caused Central American
countries to react with vehemence to Lincoln’s suggestion.
The first factor was a growing regional unity against foreign
manipulation, and the second was prevalent racial, social
structuring that had begun with Spanish colonization
centuries earlier.
Lincoln appointed Kansas Senator Samuel Pomeroy
(also Chair of the Committee on Public Lands) to survey and
make proposals for land purchases in Central American
countries.6 Before Pomeroy could make any direct efforts to
acquire land, multiple United States newspapers published
5

Basler, 1861-1862, 373-374.
Samuel Pomeroy was a Radical Republican who took part in several
pre-war abolitionist movements such as the New England Emigration
Aid Company and ‘Bleeding Kansas.’ His viewpoints made him the
perfect candidate to enthusiastically acquire land for freed slaves; see
Albert, Castel, “Pomeroy, Samuel Clarke (1816-1891).” Encyclopedia
of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History.
6
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Lincoln’s speech.7 The news traveled quickly to Central
America, where the information was republished and
interpreted in quite a different way. The Central American
press and public did not view the colonization plan as a mere
suggestion and found it offensive. The July 20, 1862 edition
of the Honduras Official Gazette reprinted an article from
the Boston Daily Advertiser and stated, “They [African
Americans] desire to emigrate to Central America… they
desire to bring to the United States that great commerce of
the Pacific, which ought to increase… the riches and power
of their common country.”8 Central Americans were
paranoid that African Americans intended to invade their
region with the primary goal to bring more prosperity to the
United States rather than help develop their new homes.
Agitation in Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica had already begun with the
printing of the Honduran article and was building upon
previously-held worries. Concerns grew regarding a large
influx of African descendants to the region, along with
7

Northern newspapers widely published this speech in its entirety or as
a summary with an analysis of Lincoln’s ‘Colonization Scheme.’ For
example, the Daily Ohio Statesman, which published the speech, and
the Juliet Signal included an analysis which suggested that the plan
showed that Lincoln disfavored a mixed-race society; see Daily Ohio
Statesman (Columbus, Ohio), 22 Aug. 1862, Chronicling America:
Historic American Newspapers, Library of Congress; Juliet Signal.
(Juliet [i.e., Joliet], Ill.), 26 Aug. 1862, Chronicling America: Historic
American Newspapers, Library of Congress.
8
Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of
Congress at the Commencement of the Third Session of the ThirtySeventh Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862),
892.
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worries about their allegiance to the United States. Every
country was loathe to have an intrusive United States colony
on their borders. The concept for the colony, and Lincoln’s
speech, had also been published before Pomeroy or
Secretary of State William Seward announced it to the
various Central American diplomatic correspondents. The
agitated public and politicians assumed this meant that the
United States planned to take land without permission. The
backlash against the proposal was swift.
The Minister to the United States for Guatemala and
Salvador, Antonio J. Yrisarri, issued a frank statement,
saying, “Colonization cannot take place, because it does not
suit the views of those governments.”9 Neither government
was interested in selling land to another country, and they
did not want immigrants unless they were educated.
Immigrants would only be accepted if they were “colonists
of a different class, who may have had a more liberal
education than those that can be acquired in a state of
slavery.”10 The Secretary of Foreign Relations for San
Salvador and Nicaragua, Pedro Zeledon, had even harsher
words to say. He thought allowing freed slaves into the
country would worsen it due to the “degradation of that
race.” It also was unacceptable for immigrants to act “under
the special protection of another nation.”11 Not only were
former slaves not wanted as immigrants, but the idea of

9

Ibid.
Ibid., 895.
11
Ibid., 896.
10
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either of the countries’ governments not having control over
immigrants to their nations was insulting.
Honduras was preemptive in their response, despite
the fact that no one had even reached out to buy land or
suggested the idea. Foreign Minister James R. Partridge
communicated the opinion of the Honduran President. Due
to the newspapers, the president figured the United States
should know Honduras’ opinion on the matter of
colonization and immigration. Honduras only wanted
“industrious whites” like the “German immigrants… in
Costa Rica,” who had created prosperity in that country.
Bringing in freed slaves was “not at all desirable” because
Honduras already faced problems with their own free
African population that supposedly refused to be lawabiding citizens. Just like the representative from San
Salvador and Nicaragua, the Honduran president said that
his country would gladly accept educated or industrious
white immigrants from the United States but wanted no more
migrants of African descent.12
Nicaragua was the most vehemently opposed to the
colonization of freed slaves in their country. The foreign
minister of the United States in Leon de Nicaragua, Andrew
B. Dickinson, communicated with the Nicaraguan
government and had this to say: “The people of Nicaragua
are very generally opposed to such a scheme,” and “they feel
indignant at being ranked with the North American negro.”
Not only were Nicaraguans against the idea of colonization,
but they were also completely offended that anyone even
12

Ibid., 891.
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thought that they should live with or around African
descendants. The whole of Nicaragua was apparently in a
panic for several weeks about Lincoln’s proposal. They
considered it the “greatest degradation for the country to be
overrun with blacks.”13 In the public mindset “negroes… are
worthless, idle, thieving vagabonds,” and if they were
allowed to intermingle with Native Americans they would
give birth to “the worst cross-breed that society can be
infested with.” A deep fear that the United States meant to
upend their society and destroy its fragile racial balance had
taken hold in Nicaragua.14
The only country that was open to the idea of
colonization was Costa Rica. Months earlier, in May, the
congress of that country began to consider proposals for a
“tract of land for the settlement of free negroes.”15 This was
a seemingly independent move from the growing unity of the
Central American coalition it soon joined.
One location, Chiriquí, was perfectly suited for
Lincoln’s desire to have a trans-oceanic colony and was
considered perfect for the health of African Americans. The
problem, however, was that the land was the object of a
dispute between Costa Rica and New Granada (modern-day
Colombia). United States Ambassador to Costa Rica Charles
N. Riotte could not see a peaceful resolution between the two
countries resulting in a sale to the United States. He also
could not recommend his government spend “one cent” to

13

Ibid., 893-894.
Ibid., 896.
15
Ibid., 887.
14
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set aside land because the United States “government would
most surely be swindled” by salesmen and landowners with
useless property whose sole desire was to make a quick
profit by setting freedmen up for failure.16
In other words, the Costa Rican government was
initially open to colonization, but the United States had to
both resolve a massive territory dispute and convince the
winner to sell the highly disputed land, or wade through a
mire of risky real estate transactions themselves. Costa
Rica’s consideration of the proposal did not last long,
though. At the same time, American businessman Ambrose
W. Thompson also suggested that the United States use a
large plot of land he owned in the disputed area. This land,
somewhere between seventy thousand to one million acres,
(later claimed to be around three million) had been sold to
Thompson by a French businessman in 1854 and was
considered for various mining and colonization purposes
ever since.17
A regional effort was assembled to stop the
colonization plan in mid-September 1862 when Minister
Luis Molina—a legation of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and
Honduras—composed a letter to Seward. As the three
countries’ representative, Molina communicated that no
country at the meeting “would consent to the formation in its
16

Ibid., 889.
The French had also tried to colonize the land in the 1850s but
several business and colonization failures led to a buyout by
Thompson; see Paul J. Scheips, "Gabriel Lafond and Ambrose W.
Thompson: Neglected Isthmusian Promoters," Hispanic American
Historical Review 36 no. 2 (May 1956), 212.
17
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territory of independent colonies, whatever might be their
color and place of departure.” None of the countries wanted
a United States-controlled colony inside their region, no
matter who was settling it. He also stated that the countries
did not want an unexpected influx of former slaves, “a
plague… the United States desire to rid themselves [of].”
Furthermore, the United States had no claim to the Costa
Rican land because it had not been sold directly from the
government to Thompson. Even if it were legal, the land was
in a disputed zone, so their government could not recognize
the sale.18
These five Central American countries had made it
clear that they were not going to allow a colony in or near
their borders. A few seemed open to the idea of limited
African American migration but were still concerned the
United States might provide too much aid for them.19 United
States support for the proposal also seemed to dwindle. A
nationally reprinted article originating from the New York
Sun compared Lincoln’s attempt to move African Americans
to another country to that of a beetle trying to move a
cannonball out of a tire rut.20 The comparison not only
18

Message of the President, 889-900.
This would have included military aid if there were conflicts or
passive assistance such as food and building materials. Any help,
however, could have been seen as the United States undermining that
government’s authority. The migrants to any of these countries would
have been considered citizens of the countries, and the concept of an
outside body aiding citizens without permission is interpretable as
sedition.
20
The New York Sun was a Republican-leaning paper. Their
comparison for moving the race issues like trying to move a cannonball
is similar in philosophy to the rejection of Liberian colonization. The
19
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indicated how futile the effort to remove such a massive
number of people would be, but also that African Americans
did not wish to leave the country.
Due to Pomeroy’s continued public organization of
the project, concerns continued through October 1862 in
Central America, and Seward had to reaffirm multiple times
that the United States was not going to settle in Central
America.21 Even so, the Palace at Managua introduced new
passport laws in a paranoid attempt to keep former slaves out
and prevent abolitionists from smuggling them in.22 Why
were these countries so ardent in their attempt to keep the
United States and African Americans away from their
borders?
Just a decade earlier, filibusters (United States
citizens who unlawfully invaded other countries with
military force, such as William Walker) invaded Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean in attempts to acquire
land and power.23 After failed attempts in Mexico in the
race issues of the United States were there to stay and had to be dealt
with, not pushed away; see Western Sentinel.(Winston [i.e. WinstonSalem], N.C.), 03 Oct. 1862, Chronicling America: Historic American
Newspapers, Library of Congress.
21
Molina had received word that Pomeroy was travelling around the
capitol recruiting men for the expedition to found new colony. Landfall
was meant to be in October, Molina received word in late September.
At this point it appeared that despite a month of backlash Pomeroy was
still organizing the colonization plan prolonging the agitation of the
Central American legation, Seward had to personally contact the
Department of Interior to halt the efforts; see Message of the President,
904.
22
Ibid., 906-907.
23
For a great source regarding the most famous filibustering cases, see
Robert E. May, Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in
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early 1850’s, Walker set out for an assault on Nicaragua in
1855. Taking advantage of that country’s civil war, he
managed to secure himself as president of the country for a
short time before a multi-national armed force removed him
from power. As president, and during his retreat northward,
however, he managed to inflict serious damage to the
reputation of the United States. To make matters worse,
instead of refuting the actions of the filibuster, President
Franklin Pierce supported the new Nicaraguan regime when
he acknowledged its legitimacy.24 Besides how he forcefully
maintained power, Walker’s actions, such as burning
Catholic churches, assaulting clergy, and trying to
reestablish slavery, left Central Americans with a
horrendous impression of the United States.25
The negative impression of the United States was
also exacerbated by the growing slavery tensions in the
country and the strain on the republican form of government.
Across Latin America during the 1850’s, Central Americans
Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2002).
24
Pierce almost immediately rescinded his recognition, however.
Perhaps the initial recognition seemed to stick with Nicaraguans more
than his later refutation. Although the United States government
attempted to prevent filibustering, the country seemed divided on the
issue and ultimately regional support or opposition dictated what
parties were able to embark on filibustering expeditions. Walker
continued filibustering until he was executed by yet another Central
American defender, Honduras, in 1860; see Kenneth Nivison,
"Purposes Just and Pacific: Franklin Pierce and the American Empire,"
Diplomacy and Statecraft 21 no. 1 (March 2010), 14-15.
25
Andrew Denton, "Filibusterism and Catholicity: Narciso López,
William Walker, and the Antebellum Struggle for America's Souls,"
U.S. Catholic Historian 33 no. 4 (Fall 2015), 11.
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feared that the United States planned to force its idea of
democracy southward. Mostly, this fear stemmed from the
assumption that should the United States acquire any of their
countries, citizens would not meet the voting requirements
of a country that seemed to only respect the level of
whiteness as a prerequisite to political power.26 The majority
of Central Americans, many being of mixed race with
varying levels of skin fairness, had only truly begun to
exercise tentative, democratic rights in the last three decades,
and the United States’ ‘Manifest Destiny’ loomed as a threat
to their political autonomy.27
The resistance to foreign powers in Central America
was another growing trend during the mid-1800’s that
seemed to unite the region into a cohesive political entity of
its own. Elites who had the most influence and power in the
region adopted the label of Latin America beginning in the
1840’s. The adoption of a ‘Latin’ identity was not only a
direct reaction to filibustering but also fear of cultural
annihilation.28 International racial and political differences
greatly strained foreign relations as Central America began
to view itself as a more liberal, democratic entity than the
United States and European powers, both of which were
thought to be encroaching on the Latin race.
Clearly critical to Central America’s rejection of
colonization or migration was a tremendous amount of
26

Michel Gobat, "The Invention of Latin America: A Transnational
History of Anti-Imperialism, Democracy, and Race," American
Historical Review 118 no. 5 (December 2013), 1353.
27
Ibid., 1352.
28
Ibid., 1367.
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racism and unfounded stereotypes. The countries of Central
America had shifted towards liberal democratic
governments during the 1840’s and 1850’s, but with much
bloodshed. Each country finally established a democratic
republic, similar to the United States, as their governing
bodies. However, the notion that African descendants and
mixed-race peoples would have gained more rights during
this time of liberal enlightenment is false. In fact, the mid1800’s coincided as a time of not only the growth of liberal
styles of government but also the growth of racist ideology
across Latin America.29
While this was many Central Americans’ first chance
to self-govern, they also used it as an opportunity to exclude
minorities such as those with large amounts of native or
African heritage. Elites were afraid of their own level of
whiteness luring the United States to conquer them, but these
people used the same racist concept to dictate who had rights
in their own societies. Central American elites also applied
the new idea of the Latin race to exclude those from power
who were not European enough. The rejection of mixed
races was a direct counter to global concerns of the
Americas’ ‘mongrelization’: the mixture of so many very
different racial groups. To combat this, elites attempted to
portray themselves as pure descendants of Spain and France
rather than a mixed culture of Europeans, Natives, and
Africans.30

29

David Cook-Martin and David FitzGerald, "Culling the Masses: A
Rejoinder," Ethnic and Racial Studies 38 no. 8 (June 2015), 1323.
30
Gobat, The Invention, 1355.
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Elites’ rejection of mixed race society in Central
America also became blended with abuse and intolerance of
those they perceived as inferior. Black and mixed-race
people were seen as having only negative qualities, as the
communications with the various foreign ministers had
previously suggested. The mistreatment of mixed race
individuals was probably a direct mimicry of American and
European practices, once again trying to illustrate how Latin
American elites were just as white as any other European
descendant. The abuse that the lower classes suffered
resulted in violent outbursts that often worsened the strain
between elite and commoner.
Latin American elites feared these riots and revolts.
In many places, former slaves or mixed-race peoples
outnumbered elite whites dramatically. The fear of being
massacred and overwhelmed by the lower classes was not a
groundbreaking idea in the 1860s. Revolutionary general
and political leader Símon Bolívar had feared the same in the
1820s following Bolivia’s independence. Even after having
large numbers of mixed race people, or, as he referred to
them, pardos, serve in his army, he did not want to give them
many rights following independence from Spain.31 He
ensured that the same class-based system endured through
the wars of revolution, at least in his country. His reiteration
of old Spanish caste ideas gave the system longevity through
the Latin American independence movements of the early
31

Aline Helg, "Simon Bolivar and the Spectre of 'Pardocracia': Jose
Padilla in Post-Independence Cartagena," Journal of Latin American
Studies 35, no. 3 (August 2003): 454,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875308.
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nineteenth century. These ideas lingered for decades and
strengthened once more in the mid-nineteenth century.
Bolívar’s fear was the rise of a pardocracia, or a
society ruled by the pardos, where whites and elites would
be exterminated and stripped of all power. For years he
attempted to maintain a government where pardos were
seemingly equal but not equal enough to impact the
government or topple the elite system.32 As one of the most
influential revolutionaries and writers in the post-colonial
Americas, Bolívar was undoubtedly influential in Central
America during the 1860s. If his ideas on race and fear of
pardocracia were not direct causes of the racist ideology of
the region, they at least affirmed that elites’ fears of lower
classes and non-whites were well founded. Consistent racial
and class conflict post-independence also seemed to lend
credence to some of Bolívar’s ideas.
One such example is when poor laborers and former
slaves in La Ciėnega, Panama, rose up in violent protest and
destroyed several U.S. buildings.33 The protests were a direct
reaction to local Panamanians losing their jobs to transport
industries on the isthmus such as railroads and steamships
after formerly using man and mule power to transport cargo
and people.34 Industrialization took away traditional jobs
such as these, and the workers’ reactions to the changes
32

Ibid.
Daley Chen Mercedes, "The Watermelon Riot: Cultural Encounters
in Panama City, 1856," The Hispanic American Historical Review,
1990, 86-87.
34
The term Panamanian is used, but at the time the isthmus was still
owned by New Granada. Ibid., 89.
33
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explain why elites viewed the mixed races not only as
violent, but also lazy. More than likely, white elites confused
lack of work and job opportunities, especially for poor
laborers, with laziness. In actuality, the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution had put more strain on an already
heavily-bowed system of social inequality. The racism
shown in the communications between the U.S. and Central
America resulted from a lack of privileges and the lack of
knowledge for modern, industrial jobs slowly replacing
traditional ones. The supposedly-liberal governments of
Central America actively oppressed instead of liberated.
Africans and natives were not violent and lazy but were
subjects to a region that refused to modernize a large group
of its population with obvious negative outcomes that were
viewed as racial inferiority, rather than government
incompetence.
Each Central American country stood ardently in
their rejection of United States colonization to the region.
Fear of the United States encroaching onto their territory
made each country extremely hesitant to negotiate land
terms after a decade of filibustering and inter-American
violence. To Central America, the United States had
morphed from a role model into a hovering menace whose
government and people could bear down on their countries
at any moment.
The racial climate in Central America proved
unforgiving of the proposal. The cultures of the area had
been built around race and class. The formation of a Latin
American identity bolstered the attempts of elites to portray
themselves as white and reject mixed race and mixed culture
62
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society. These elites viewed Black and mixed-race
individuals as inferior, despite playing a large part in their
unemployment through the introduction of industry without
proper education.
Lincoln’s ‘scheme’ to colonize freed slaves into
Central America had been a disaster. Seward and his
ambassadors worked throughout the fall of 1862 to ensure
that good relations were maintained with Central America.
The United States, in the midst of its bloodiest conflict, could
not afford to break friendships with even the smallest of
countries. The ultimate question, what to do with all of the
freed African Americans, had to wait. Even this small
attempt to answer it had kicked off an international panic and
threatened the United States with diplomatic retaliation.
International tensions and cultural phenomena in Central
America prevented any possible settlement and caused
Lincoln’s first colonization plan to fail.
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